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LEFT INVERTIBILITY OF OUTPUT-QUANTIZED SYSTEMS: AN
APPLICATION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
NEVIO DUBBINI, ANNA CARLUCCIO AND ANTONIO BICCHI
ABSTRACT. In this paper a secure communication method is proposed, based on left in-
vertibility of output-quantized dynamical systems. The sender uses an output-quantized
linear system with a feedback function to encode messages, which are sequences of inputs
of the system. So left invertibility property enables the receiver to recover the messages.
The secret key is formed by the system’s parameters, including the feedback function. The
use of quantization makes the cryptographic system work exactly, and without asymptotic
estimates. Simulations of encoding-decoding procedure and results about security of the
method are finally shown.
1. INTRODUCTION
Quantized control systems are an important class of hybrid systems. Hybrid systems
have a great flexibility in modeling dynamic phenomena, since they combine a continu-
ous state-space description associated with physical representation with a discrete-event
description associated with software logic. In quantized systems the hybrid nature is given
by the existence of both continuous variables (state-space variables), and discrete valued
variables (input and output variables). Quantized control systems have been attracting in-
creasing attention in recent years ([1, 3, 7, 21, 25]). The mathematical operation of quanti-
zation and the possibility of considering only finite inputs have practical and technological
motivations in control with discrete sensors and/or actuators and control under communi-
cation constraints (in large-scale systems): see for example [2, 6, 15, 26, 27] and reference
therein.
Left invertibility of control dynamical systems has to do with injectivity of the I/O map:
roughly speaking a system is left invertible if the input sequence can be reconstructed
on the basis of the output sequence. Invertibility of linear systems is a well understood
problem, pioneered by [4], and then considered with algebraic approaches in [24], and
frequency domain techniques ([16, 17]). More recent work has addressed the invertibility
of nonlinear systems ([22, 23]). In [28], the left invertibility problem for a switched system
is discussed. Left invertibility setting in relation with output-quantized systems, and results
about contractive systems are given in ([9]).
In this paper a cryptographic system is proposed, based on left invertibility of output-
quantized control systems. Messages are represented by sequences of inputs. An output-
quantized linear system with a feedback function is used to generate the encoded messages,
and left invertibility enables the receiver to recover the messages. The secret key is formed
by the system’s parameters, including the feedback function. Quantization makes the cryp-
tosystem work in finite time.
The proposed cryptosystem model is based on chaotic behavior. Since chaotic sig-
nals are unpredictable in practice, noiselike and broadband, they have been proposed as a
system to masking information. The main technique on which chaotic cryptosystems are
based is synchronization, i.e. two chaotic systems reach equal states at each time step.
Since the pioneering work [20], many methods to achieve secure communication rely-
ing on chaos synchronization have been proposed. Chaos synchronization is obtained by
impulsive differential equations in [29], by unknown input observers in [14, 18], by left in-
vertibility and flatness of switched system in [26]. In [29, 13] the reader may find a rather
general treatment about chaos synchronization techniques.
The contribution of this paper is a framework to achieve a chaos communication method,
using a system that generates chaos, based on left invertibility of quantized systems. Quan-
tification gives a more likely setting for chaotic cryptosystems, since it avoids infinite pre-
cision (real numbers), which is normally needed in general treatments on chaotic synchro-
nization, for theoretical results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II contains definitions and results about left
invertibility of output-quantized systems. In section III a cryptosystem is presented, which
uses an output-quantized linear system for the enconding of a message, and a left invert-
ibility procedure for the decoding. Section IV contains results about the security of the
proposed cryptosystem, while section V shows an example of a practical implementation
of the encoding/deconding procedure. Section V shows conclusions and future perspec-
tives. The final appendix contains a more technical proof of a Theorem.
Notations: Throughout this paper we indicate with:
• pip the canonical projection on the first p coordinate axes,
• ϖi the canonical projection on the i− th coordinate axis,
• ei the i− th vector of the canonical basis,
• 〈v1, . . . ,vi〉 the space generated by vectors v1, . . . ,vi,
• \ the set difference,
• b·c the floor function, acting componentwise.
2. BACKGROUND: LEFT INVERTIBILITY AND LEFT D-INVERTIBILITY
Definition 1. The uniform partition of rate δ ofRp isP = {Pi}=
{
[i1δ ,(i1+1)δ [ × . . .× [ipδ ,(ip+1)δ [
}
,
where i = i1, . . . , ip ∈ Zp. ♦
Definition 2. The map qP :Rp→ Zp such that qP(x) = i⇔ x ∈Pi will be referred as to
the quantizer induced by the uniform partitionP . ♦
With regards to left invertibility results in this paper we consider discrete-time systems
of the form {
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k)
y(k) = qP
(
Cx(k)
) (1)
where x(k) ∈ Rd is the state, y(k) ∈ Zp is the output, and u(k) ∈U ⊂ Rm is the input. We
assume that U is a finite set of cardinality n. A,B,C are matrices of appropriate dimen-
sions. Without loss of generality, with a change of bases, in the system (1) we can suppose
δ = 1, C = pip. Therefore only output–quantized linear systems of the following form are
considered: {
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k)
y(k) = bpipx(k)c. (2)
Notations: Hk2k1
(
x(0),u(1), . . . ,u(k2)
)
will denote the sequence of outputs
(
y(k1), . . . ,y(k2)
)
generated by the system (2) with initial condition x(0) and inputs
(
u(1), . . . ,u(k2)
)
. ♦
Definition 3. A pair of input strings {u(i)}i∈N, {u′(i)}i∈N is uniformly distinguishable in
k steps, if there exists l such that ∀x(0),x′(0) ∈ Rd and ∀m> l the following holds:
u(m) 6= u′(m)
⇓
Hm+km
(
x(0),u(1), . . . ,u(m+ k)
)
6=
6= Hm+km
(
x′(0),u′(1), . . . ,u′(m+ k)
)
.
(3)
Outputs y(i) are referred to the system with initial condition x(0) and inputs u(i), while
outputs y′(i) are referred to the system with initial condition x′(0) and inputs u′(i). k is
called the distinguishability time. ♦
Definition 4. A system of type (2) is uniformly left invertible (ULI) in k steps if every pair
of distinct input sequences is uniformly distinguishable in k steps after a finite time l, where
k and l are constant. ♦
For a ULI system, it is possible to recover the input string until instant m observing
the output string until instant m+ k. A simple trick shows left invertibility properties in
a different perspective: roughly speaking a system is left invertible if the state exits a
particular “diagonal” set.
Definition 5. The quantization-diagonal set relative to the system (2) is
Q =
⋃{
[i1, i1+1[× . . . [ip, ip+1[×〈ep+1, . . . ,ed〉
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂〈e1,...,ed〉
×
×
{
[i1, i1+1[× . . . [ip, ip+1[×〈ed+p+1, . . . ,e2d〉
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
⊂〈ed+1,...,e2d〉
⊂ R2d ,
where the union is taken over i1, . . . , ip ∈ Z. ♦
In other words, Q contains all pairs of states that are in the same element of the partition
P , and to address left invertibility, from the point of view of the quantization-diagonal set,
we are interested in studying the following system on R2d .
Definition 6. The doubled system relative to the system (2) is
X(k+1) =
[
Ax(k)+Bu(k)
Ax′(k)+Bu′(k)
]
(4)
where X(k) =
(
x(k)
x′(k)
)
∈ R2d ; U(k) =
(
u(k)
u′(k)
)
∈U ×U . ♦
If it is possible to find an initial state in Q and an appropriate choice of the strings
{u(k)},{u′(k)} such that the orbit of (4) remains in Q, it means that the two strings of
inputs give rise to the same output for the system (2). Conditions ensuring that the state is
outside Q for some k will be sought to guarantee left invertibility.
Definition 7. The difference system associated with the system (2) is
z(k+1) = Az(k)+Bv(k) (5)
where z(k) ∈ Rd , v(k) ∈Z =U −U = {u−u′ : u ∈U , u′ ∈U }. ♦
Remark 1. The difference system represents at any instant the difference between the two
states z(k) = x(k)− x′(k) when the input symbols u(k)− u′(k) = v(k) are performed. Let
S = (]−1,1[)p×〈ep+1, . . . ,ed〉. We are interested in understanding the conditions under
which
{z(k)} ∩ S = /0.
Indeed, this implies that y(k) 6= y′(k). The converse is obviously not true. ♦
Notations: Dk2k1
(
z(0),v(1), . . . ,v(k2)
)
will denote the sequence (pipz(k1), . . . ,pipz(k2))
generated by the system (5) with initial condition z(0) and inputs (v(1), . . . ,v(k2)). ♦
Definition 8. A pair of input strings {u(i)}i∈N, {u′(i)}i∈N is uniformly D-distinguishable
in k steps if there exists l ∈ N such that ∀x(0),x′(0) ∈ Rd and ∀m> l the following holds:
v(m) 6= 0 ⇒
Dm+km
(
z(0),v(1), . . . ,v(m+ k)
) 6∈ ]−1,1[p× . . .×]−1,1[p︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1 times
where z(0) = x(0)− x′(0) and v(i) = u(i)−u′(i). k is called the distinguishability time. ♦
Definition 9. A system of type (2) is uniformly left D-invertible (ULDI) in k steps if every
pair of distinct input sequences is uniformly D-distinguishable in k steps after a finite time
l, where k and l are constant. ♦
Left D-left invertibility implies left invertibility, but the viceversa is not true in general
(see [10]). The (first) key point dealing with the introduction of left D-invertibility is the
fact that there exists an algorithmic procedure to check it. Precisely it holds:
Theorem 1. [10] Consider the system (2) and suppose that
• if λ is an eigenvalue of the matrix A, then |λ | 6= 1;
• A does not have an eigenvector in 〈ep+1, . . . ,ed〉.
Then, there exists an algorithmic procedure to check left D-invertibility and find out the
invertibility time. ♦
3. CHAOS COMMUNICATION METHOD USING UNIFORM LEFT INVERTIBILITY
In this section a cryptosystem is presented, with symmetric key, based on of left invert-
ibility of output-quantized linear systems. The encoding of this communication method
uses such a system (see figure 1), where inputs are divided in known and unknown. The
known inputs are obtained by a feedback function of the system’s parameters and the un-
known inputs are arbitrary sequences of symbols in a finite alphabet. Therefore the plain-
text, i.e. the information to be transmitted, is the unknown input sequence, and the cipher-
text, which has to be transmitted on a unsafe channel, is the output sequence. The decoding
is performed by a left inversion algorithm. The secret key is made of the system’s param-
eters, his invertibility time and the feedback function. Our encoding strategy is performed
by the following system: {
x(k+1) = Ax(k)+Bu(k)+Nv(k)
y(k) = qP [Cx(k)]
(6)
where u(k)∈U (]U <∞, where ] denotes the cardinality) is the unknown input, v(k)∈ V
is the known input, y(k) ∈ Zp is the output, A, B, N, C are matrices with appropriate
dimensions. The known input signal v(k) is generated by a function f , whose arguments
are the system’s parameters (they can be A,B,C,N,k,y, but not necessarily all).
The decoding scheme (see figure 1) is obtained by an inversion algorithm based on
ULDI. The information signal is reconstructed by left D-invertibility, assuming that the
system (6) satisfies the hypotheses of Theorems 1.
Remark 2. It’s important to recall that ULDI of output-quantized linear systems is algo-
rithmically checkable. But another fundamental fact is that ULDI is not affected by the
introduction of known inputs: indeed the reader can easily check that systems (2) and (6)
give rise to the same difference system. ♦
Before getting into details of the inversion algorithm, it might be useful to highlight the
relation between ULDI and ULI of systems of type (6): they are indeed equivalent for a
full measure set.
Theorem 2. Consider the system (6), and suppose B,C,N,U ,P fixed. Define SD to be
the set of matrices A ∈ Rd×d such that the system (6) is uniformly left D-invertible. Define
S to be the set of matrices A ∈ Rd×d such that the system (6) is uniformly left invertible.
Then S\SD has Lebesgue measure zero in Rd×d . Here \ denotes the set difference.
Proof: See appendix. ♦
We now describe the left inversion algorithm. It assumes the a priori knowledge of the
invertibility time of the system (6), which is denoted with inv time. It is worth noting that
Theorem 1 provide an algorithmic procedure to check left D-invertibility and find out the
invertibility time of the system (6).
Definition 10. A convex polytope in Rd is a set that can be described as{
x ∈ Rd : Mx≤ K
}
,
where M ∈ Rm×d , K ∈ R1×m, and ≤ is intended to act componentwise. ♦
Note that a polytope can be empty or unbounded. For a general reference on convex
polytopes see [11].
Given the sequence of outputs {y(k)}k∈N, the algorithm recovers the input symbol u(k)
reading the outputs
(
(y(k), . . . ,y(k+ inv time)
)
. The following are the main steps of the
algorithm.
(1) For every i= k, . . . ,k+ inv time, compute the polytope P(i) that contains the states
that give rise to the output y(i):
P(i) =
[
y1(i),y1(i)+1
[ × . . .× [yp(i),yp(i)+1[ ×
×〈ep+1, . . . ,ed〉;
where p is the dimension of the output.
(2) For i = k, . . . ,k+ inv time, compute the polytopes R(i) representing the possible
reached states compatible with the observed outputs. This is done iteratively, at
each step computing the image ofR(i) under the dynamics of the system (6) given
by every u∈U , and successively intersecting with the polytope P(i+1), that rep-
resents the observed output:
R(k) = P(k)
R(i+1) =
[
∪u∈U A(R(i))+Bu+Nv(i)
] ⋂
P(i+1).
(3) Since the system is left invertbile in time inv time, all input strings that generates
the polytopesR(inv time) begins with the same input symbols, i.e. the input u(k)
is recovered.
4. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we give some results about the security of the proposed communication
method. A fundamental issue for the validation of a cryptographic system is the cryptanal-
ysis, that is the study of cryptographic schemes in order to reveal their possible weakness.
An essential hypothesis in cryptanalysis ([8]) is that every detail about the cryptographic
system must be known, except the secret key, on which the security of the cryptosystem
should be entirely based.
In order to assess the security of the proposed cryptosystem we will show that, once
assigned a plaintext and a ciphertext of arbitrary length, there are infinite choices of the
secret key parameters that realizes the coupling, of which only one represents the secret
key.
FIGURE 1. Communication method based on left invertibility of output-
quantized systems proposed in this paper.
Consider for example the brute force attack and the plaintext attack. Brute force attack
consists essentially in trying exhaustively every possible parameter value in the parame-
ter space of the secret key. In the plaintext attack instead the eavesdropper is supposed to
know both the plaintext and the ciphertext: in our setting the pair of sequences {u(k),y(k)}
is supposed to be known for a finite number of k ∈ N. Thanks to the following Theorem
3 both in brute force and plaintext attack the eavesdropper cannot identify the system’s
parameters, since in any case it remains an ambiguity given by an infinite number of pos-
sibilities.
Theorem 3. Consider the system (6), and fix any pair of sequences
{
v(k),y(k)
}T
k=1, for
T ∈ N. Then there exists an infinite number of choices of the matrices A,B,C,N and the
function f such that the pair
{
v(k),y(k)
}T
k=1 is an input/output pair.
Proof: We describe two possible strategies in such a way that there exists an infinite
number of choices of parameters of the system (6) that realizes {v(k),y(k)}Tk=1 as an in-
put/output pair. It is clearly sufficient to prove the theorem.
(1) Suppose that the matrices A,B,C,N are fixed (though they are unknown parame-
ters of the secret key). Then define a function
f = f (A,B,C,N,y)
such that
y(i) 6= y( j) ∀ i, j = 1, . . . ,T, i 6= j.
This can be done for instance in the following way: consider the image of any
element of the partitionP under the map
F : x 7→
⋃
u∈U
Ax+Bu+N f (y),
and choose f such that
x ∈Pi ⇒ F(x) 6∈Pi.
Note that such an f can be defined in an infinite number of ways.
(2) Choose f = f (y(k),k). Clearly there is an infinite number of choices of f , thanks
to the time-dependence, that realizes any input/output pair. ♦
5. AN EXAMPLE
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed communication method, a simula-
tion experiment is carried out to serve as an example. We can consider the system:{
x(k+1) = 12 x(k)+piu(k)+
√
71v(k)
y(k) = bx(k)c (7)
Moreover, let U = {0,1} be the inputs alphabet and define
f (k,y(k)) = 110 · sink · siny(k) · siny(k−1) · siny(k−2) · siny(k−3)
to be the feedback function. We can observe, besides, that (] denotes the cardinality)
∀u, u′ ∈U , |u−u′|> |a|+1
]U
so (7) is ULDI and has invertibility time equal to one ([10]).
Therefore, if the information signal is
v = [1111000111011111000001010
10101110000101001111100001]
as shown in figure 2 (a), then the encoded signal is shown in figure 2 (b), and the recovered
signal is shown in figure 2 (c). The (null) error is shown in figure 2 (d) (the implementation
of the algorithm can be found in [5]).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper a secure communication method based on left invertibility of output-
quantized linear system, with finite inputs, is presented. Plaintext is represented by se-
quences of inputs on a finite alphabet. The ciphertext is the output of a quantized linear
system with a feedback function and a left invertibility algorithm allows the recovery of
the message. The secret key is formed by the system’s parameters, including the feedback
function.
We emphasize two main advantages of the proposed cryptographic system. First, the
use of quantization is more realistic when digital data transmission is used, and makes
the cryptosystem reproduce the plaintext exactly in finite time. Secondly, the feedback
function adds an infinite-dimensional degree of freedom in the secret key, which is a dis-
tinct advantage with respect to methods where guessing a finite, albeit large, number of
parameters would allow an eavesdropper to break the code.
Notwithstanding the apparent advantages, a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability
of the proposed cryptographic system in the face of specific threat models is missing at this
point, and will be the subject of further investigations.
FIGURE 2. Simulation of the cryptosystem (7) (a) information signal
u(k) (plaintext), (b) transmitted signal y(k) (ciphertext), (c) recovered
signal, (d) difference between the plaintext and the recovered signal: the
signal is recovered exactly.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 2
Definition 11. Indicate with Q[ζ1, . . . ,ζN ] the ring of polynomials in the variables ζi with
coefficients inQ. The set of numbers α1, . . . ,αN ∈C is said to be algebraically independent
if
0 6= p(ζ1, . . . ,ζN) ∈Q[ζ1, . . . ,ζN ] ⇒ p(α1, . . . ,αN) 6= 0. ♦
We will show that, if in the output-quantized system (6) the set of elements of the matrix
A is algebraically independent, then the system is uniformly left D-invertible if and only if
it is uniformly left invertible. This implies that S\SD has Lebesgue measure zero in Rd×d
for every B,C,N,U ,P: this implication is proved final part of the proof.
Let us parametrize the possible pairs of states (x,x′) ∈ R2d such that x′− x ∈S with
the set
I =
{(
t1, . . . , td , t1+ s1, . . . , tp+ sp, td+p+1, . . . , t2d
)
such that ti,∈ R, sk ∈]−1,1[
}
.
Moreover we define the 2-dimensional plane Pi to be
Pi = {X ∈ R2d : ϖ jX = 0, j 6= i, i+d},
i.e. Pi is the 2-dimensional plane generated by the i− th and the i+ d− th component of
vectors in R2d . If X = (t1, . . . , td , t1 + s1, . . . , tp + sp, td+p+1, . . . , t2d) ∈ I, for i = 1, . . . , p,
define di(X) to be the distance, measured along the line
{t1, . . . , τi︸︷︷︸
varies
, . . . , td , t1+ s1, . . .
. . . , τi︸︷︷︸
varies
+si, . . . , tp+ sp, td+p+1, . . . , t2d : τi ∈ R}
from the set Ωi obtained by the union of the i− th and i+d− th coordinate axes.
We provide conditions such that ∀ε > 0, ∀m ∈ N, ∀s1, . . . ,sp ∈]− 1,1[, there exists
t1, . . . , td ∈R such that, if {X( j)}mj=0 is the orbit of the 2d-dimensional system with X(0) =
(t1, . . . , td , t1+ s1, . . . , tp+ sp, t˜p+1, . . . , t˜d), then the following holds
f rac
(
di(X( j)
)
< ε, (8)
for every i = 1, . . . , p, j = 1, . . . ,m. Here f rac(·) denotes the fractional part, acting com-
ponentwise. If conditions (8) are satisfied, the system is not uniformly left invertible (see
[10]). These conditions will be verified by a full measure set. Consider the set
S′ =
{
A ∈ Rd×d : {ai j}di, j=1 alg. independent set
}
.
Set A ∈ S′. For i = 1, . . . , p, simple (but boring) calculations show that ϖ〈ei,ed+i〉X( j) has
the form (
ϖiX( j)
ϖi+dX( j)
)
= ϖ〈i,i+d〉
[(
A 0
0 A
) j
X(0)+
+
(
A 0
0 A
) j−1
BU(1)+ . . .+BU( j)+
+
(
A 0
0 A
) j−1
NV (1)+ . . .+NV ( j)
]
=
=
 c
( j)
i1 t1+ . . .+ c
( j)
id td
c( j)i1 t1+ . . .+ c
( j)
ip tp+ c
( j)
i(p+1)td+p+1+ . . .+ c
( j)
id t2d

+constant terms,
where c( j)il is the entry (i, l) of the matrix A
j. The set
{
a( j)il : i, l = 1, ...d; j = 1, ...N
}
is a
linearly independent set, thanks to the algebraic independence hypothesis on the elements
of the matrix A (see [10]), so, by Kronecker’s Theorem ([12]) there exists a choice of
(t1 . . . , td , td+p+1, . . . , t2d) such that equation (8) is satisfied. Therefore the system (6) is not
ULI.
To prove that the set of matrices with algebraically independent entries are a full mea-
sure set, first observe that the set of polynomial P∈Q[ζ1, . . . ,ζd2 ] is countable. For a single
polynomial P the set
0P =
{
(x1, . . . ,xd2) ∈ Rd
2
: P(x1, . . . ,xd2) = 0
}
is a finite union of manifolds of dimension at most d2− 1. So the measure of 0P is zero.
Moreover
S′ =
⋃
P∈Q[ζ1,...,ζd2 ]
0P,
i.e. S′ is a countable union of sets of measure zero, which in turn implies that the measure
of S′ is zero. ♦
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